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Abstract
As a famous result, the “37% Law” for Secretary Prob-
lem has widely influenced peoples’ perception on online
decision strategies about choice. However, using this strat-
egy, too many attractive candidates may be rejected in the
first 37%, and in practice people also tend to stop ear-
lier(Bearden, Rapoport, and Murphy 2006). In this paper, we
argued that in most cases, the best-only optimization does not
obtain an optimal outcome, while the optimal cutoff should
be O(
√
n). And we also showed that in some strict objective
that only cares several best candidates, Θ(n) skips are still
needed.
1 Introduction
As a fundamental online decision problem, the Secretary
Problem requires the Decision Maker(DM) go through a se-
quence of n applicants, and decide to accept or reject im-
mediately after observing one applicant, and the target is
to maximize the probability to choose the best applicant
(Ferguson 1989).
In the original problem, the optimal solution is to skip the
first n/e applicants and accept one immediately afterwards
if it is the best so far. the maximized probability is 1/e.
However, in practice, it is often more desirable to choose
a “good” applicant, not exactly the “best”. It was discov-
ered (Bearden 2006) that the optimal cutoff point decreases
to
√
n if the target is to minimize the expected ranking. As
the result differs from the original problem, it suggests that
different targets make a great difference of the optimal cut-
off point. The “37% rule” has wide impression on people’s
perception of choice, but it is actually misleading because
most people are not stubborn for the very best. Therefore,
our motivation is to go further and make it general for arbi-
trary utility functions, and explore the high-level rule for the
generalized Secretary Problem.
In this paper, we inherited the method to compute with the
“actual values” rather than ranks, but as the payoff function
can be non-linear, the mapping is asymptotic when n→∞,
more subtle with concentration properties, and only works
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for Lipschitz continuous functions of relative ranks. Then
we proved the optimal cutoff is generally O(
√
n) in most
cases, as a strong challenge against “37% rule”.
In the last part, we go to the case where the target is to
choose one of the O(1) best applicants. In this case, though,
Θ(n) skips are still required.
2 Asymptotic evaluation
2.1 Randomized relative ranking technique
The generalized Secretary Problem is:
P1:
n applicants with different ranking are interviewed by DM
one by one. After applicant i is interviewed, DM only knows
whether he is the best so far, and must make a decision to
accept or reject. If the accepted applicant is in rank r, the
utility is v(r) (as a decreasing funtion) and the game ends;
if rejects, DM goes on to applicant i + 1. Applicant n must
be accepted if reached.
Inspired by Bearden(2006), we can consider their “random-
ized relative ranking”, assume them to be uniformly dis-
tributed in interval [0, 1], and define w( r
n
) = v(r) to be the
utility as a function of relative ranking. This randomized rel-
ative ranking differs from the actual relative ranking, but it
can be proved that when w is fixed and n → ∞ , with high
probability the difference converges to 0.
Therefore, we firstly consider the problem P2:
P2:
n applicants with i.i.d types t[n] uniformly distributed in
[0, 1] are interviewed by DM one by one, and there is a de-
creasing utility function w : [0, 1] → R. After applicant i
is interviewed, DM only knows whether ti = mink∈[i]{tk},
and must make a decision to accept or reject. If he accepts,
the utility is w(ti) and the game ends; if rejects, DM goes on
to applicant i+ 1. Applicant n must be accepted if reached.
Fix w and n. When the cutoff point is c, for t < n the prob-
ability of accepting the t-th applicant is:
Pc(t) =
(
t−1∏
s=c
s− 1
s
)
· 1
t
=
c− 1
t(t− 1) ,
and the expected utility of the best among t is:
Ec(t) = t
ˆ 1
0
w(x)(1 − x)t−1dx.
The probability of accepting the n−th applicant is:
Pc(n) =
(
n−1∏
s=c
s− 1
s
)
=
c− 1
n− 1 ,
and the last is reached iff the best is in the first c−1 places or
the best is in place n and the second best is in the first c− 1
places, with probability
c− 1
n
and
c− 1
n(n− 1) respectively.
Therefore
Ec(n) =
n− 1
n
E− +
1
n
EM ,
with E− denoting the expectation of any non-maximum
w(ti), and E+ denoting the expectation of the maximum of
w(ti). Because in each instance of w(t[n]), there are n − 1
non-maximum and 1 maximum,Ec(n) is exactly the expec-
tation of w(u[0, 1]), i.e.
Ec(n) =
ˆ 1
0
w(x)dx.
Therefore, the overall expectation is
Ec =
n−1∑
t=c
Pc(t)Ec(t) + Pc(n)Ec(n)
=
(
n−1∑
t=c
c− 1
t− 1
ˆ 1
0
w(x)(1 − x)t−1dx
)
+
c− 1
n− 1
ˆ 1
0
w(x)dx. (1)
2.2 Equivalence for asymptoticity
We denote sn,i be the i−th smallest in un[0, 1] Now we
compute a high-probability bound to the range of sn,i. If
sn,i < x, then at least i samples among n in u[0, 1] are less
than x, and if sn,i > x, then at most i− 1 samples among n
in u[0, 1] are less than x. By Chernoff Bound,
Pr[sn,i <
i
n
− ǫ] < e−2nǫ2 ,
Pr[sn,i >
i+ 1
n
+ ǫ] < e−2nǫ
2
,
so for large n, with high probability,
∀i ∈ [n],
∣∣∣∣sn,i − in
∣∣∣∣ ≤ lnn√n .
Therefore, for fixed uniformly continuousw and large n, (1)
is an asymptotic estimation of the expected utility in Prob-
lem P1.
3 Finding the optimum
3.1 Concavity of expected utility
By intuition, Ec should be a single-peak function, because
initially as more applicants are observed, the DM has more
experience to identify good candidates, but if too many have
been rejected, probably the best is also skipped. Now we
prove this.
Define∆Ec = Ec − Ec−1, ∆2Ec = ∆Ec −∆Ec−1, then
∆Ec =
(
n−1∑
t=c
1
t− 1
ˆ 1
0
w(x)(1 − x)t−1dx
)
−
ˆ 1
0
w(x)(1 − x)c−2dx+
´ 1
0
w(x)dx
n− 1 , (2)
∆2Ec =
1
c− 2
ˆ 1
0
w(x)·(1−x)c−3 ·((c−1)x−1)dx. (3)
For c ≥ 3, because
´ 1
0
(1− x)c−3 · ((c− 1)x− 1)dx = 0
and
w(x) · (1 − x)c−3 · ((c− 1)x− 1)
{
< 0, x ∈ (0, 1
c−1 )
> 0, x ∈ ( 1
c−1 , 1)
,
wlog we can assume w( 1
c−1) = 0, then as w is a decreasing
function, ∀x ∈ [0, 1], w(x) · (1−x)c−3 · ((c−1)x−1) ≤ 0.
Therefore,
∆2Ec ≤ 0. (4)
So Ec is a concave function of c. To find the maximum of
Ec, we only need to find (via binary search) the largest c s.t.
∆tc > 0.
3.2 General estimation of optimal cutoff
As Bearden has proved that cOPT =
√
n for linear w, it
shows that in some cases the optimal cutoff is much less than
n, which differs much from “37% rule”. Here, we prove that
it is the general case for all “smooth” utility functions.
Theorem 1 In problem P2, the optimal cutoff cOPT =
O(
√
n) if w(x) is bounded and satisfies Lipschitz condition
in [0, ǫ] for some ǫ > 0.
Proof of Theorem 1 Wlog we assume w(x) ≤ 0, w(0) =
0. Let c = λ
√
n+O(1) for fixed λ > 0.
From (2), we have
∆Ec =
ˆ 1
0
w(x)
n− 1dx
+
ˆ ǫ
0
(
n−1∑
t=c
(1− x)t−1
t− 1 − (1 − x)
c−2
)
w(x)dx
+
ˆ 1
ǫ
(
n−1∑
t=c
(1− x)t−1
t− 1 − (1− x)
c−2
)
w(x)dx.
For fixed w(x), we have
ˆ 1
0
w(x)
n− 1dx < 0,
ˆ 1
0
w(x)
n− 1dx = Θ
(
1
n
)
. (5)
Becausew(x) satisfies Lipschitz condition in [0, ǫ], there ex-
ists a constant L s.t ∀x ∈ [0, ǫ], w(x) ∈ [−Lx, 0].
Therefore,
ˆ ǫ
0
(
n−1∑
t=c
(1− x)t−1
t− 1 − (1− x)
c−2
)
w(x)dx
< −
ˆ ǫ
0
(1− x)c−2w(x)dx
≤ L
ˆ ǫ
0
(1− x)c−2xdx
= O
(ˆ ǫ
0
(1− x)λ
√
nxdx
)
= O
(
1− (1− ǫ)λ
√
n+1(1 + ǫ+ ǫλ
√
n)
2 + 3λ
√
n+ λ2n
)
= O
(
1
λ2n
)
. (6)
Assume w(x) is bounded to [−M, 0]. Then
ˆ 1
ǫ
(
n−1∑
t=c
(1− x)t−1
t− 1 − (1− x)
c−2
)
w(x)dx
≤ −
ˆ 1
ǫ
(1− x)c−2w(x)dx
≤ M
ˆ 1
ǫ
(1− x)c−2dx
≤ M(1− ǫ)(1 − ǫ)c−2
= O(e−ǫλ
√
n)
= o
(
1
n
)
. (7)
From (5)(6)(7), for any fixedw(x) satisfying the conditions,
we can find (big enough) constant λ to make ∆Ec < 0 for
n large enough. Therefore, based on the concavity of Ec,
c > cOPT , implying
cOPT = O(
√
n),
and an asymptotic upper bound is
cOPT .
√
L
wˆ
n,
in which
wˆ =
ˆ 1
0
(w(0)− w(x))dx.
4 When are Θ(n) skips still needed?
Theorem 1 suggests in most cases the optimal cutoff point
is O(
√
n), but it needs the DM to only care about “relative”
ranking and do not care much about the top ones. However,
there does exist cases where only the best one (or several of
best ones) matters, e.g. competing for a medal in Olympic
Games.
In the original Secretary Problem, the asymptotic optimal
cutoff point is n/e when the top one is desired. What if the
target is to accept one of top k = O(1) applicants no matter
how large n is? Intuitively,Θ(n) skips are still needed. And
we prove this.
Theorem 2 To maximize the probability to accept one of
the best k = O(1) participants among n, cOPT = Θ(n),
and the success probability P (cOPT ) = Θ(1).
Proof of Theorem 2 If the i−th participant is among the
k best ones (denoted as “good ones”) and picked and c =
o(n), then for n → ∞, the probability that any good one
is skipped converges to 0. So with probability 1 − o(1), he
must be the first of good ones, and the best one in first i− 1
must be in the first c− 1.
Therefore, the success probability is
P (c) =
n∑
i=c
Ck−1n−i
Ckn
· c− 1
i− 1 + o(1)
∼
n∑
i=c
(1− i
n
)k−1
nk
· c− 1
i− 1 ,
so
P (c)− P (c− 1)
∼ 1
nk
n∑
i=c
(1 − i
n
)k−1
i− 1 −
c− 2
nk
(1− c−1
n
)k−1
c− 2
=
1
nk
(
n∑
i=c
(1− i
n
)k−1
i− 1 − (1−
c− 1
n
)k−1
)
.
Because c = o(n), for n large enough,
n∑
i=c
(1− i
n
)k−1
i− 1 >
3c∑
i=c
(1 − i
n
)k−1
i− 1
> (1− c
n
)k−1
3c∑
i=c
1
i− 1
= (1− o(1))(ln 3 + o(1))
= ln 3 + o(1),
and
(1− c− 1
n
)k−1 < 1.
Therefore, for n→ +∞ and c = o(n),
P (c)− P (c− 1) > 0
always holds, indicating cOPT > c. Therefore,
cOPT = Ω(n).
And because cOPT ≤ n, we have
cOPT = Θ(n).
Because P (cOPT ) ≥ P (⌊n/e⌋) & 1/e,
P (cOPT ) = Θ(1).
5 Conclusion
Theorem 1 indicates that, in either of following cases, the
optimal cutoff point is O(
√
n):
1) Applicants’ abilities are i.i.d. drawn from a bounded dis-
tribution with density function greater than δ > 0 near
the top 1 , and the DM wants to maximize the expected
ability of the accepted one.
2) The DM cares about the relative ranking of the accepted
in any way that “does not extremely prioritize the top
ones”.
However, the normal distribution does not satisfy condition
1), but in practice, deviations beyond a few σs are extremely
unlikely, so if we do not expect them to come, or their ex-
cellence does not make a big difference actually, then the
O(
√
n) rule still makes sense.
This result suggests that in most cases, the decision maker
does not need to skip so many applicants for a best candi-
date. Intuitively, if the 37% rule is adopted, with 37% prob-
ability the desired best one is rejected at the beginning, re-
sulting in a bad outcome of choosing the random one at the
last position. But if onlyO(
√
n) are skipped, with high (1−
O( 1√
n
)) probability the end is not reached and the accepted
one is probably fairly good. That also explains why people
tend to stop early (Bearden, Rapoport, and Murphy 2006). It
is not merely an irrational psychological phenomenonor due
to “cost of observing”, but does improve the expected out-
come when they are not too particular.
The asymptotic upper bound cOPT .
√
L
wˆ
n indicates that
the more the DM cares about top ones (largerL compared to
wˆ), the more skips are needed. As the condition of Theorem
1 requires the DM not to “extremely prioritize” top ones, it
suggests that if the DM does have some strict objective, e.g.
only cares several top ones instead of relative rankings,Θ(n)
skips are still required (as in the original Secretary Problem),
and Theorem 2 shows it.
1It cannot be altered to “a distribution without long tails”, e.g.
w(x) = −√x has no long tail, but violates the condition of Theo-
rem 1. In fact, it does extremely prioritize the top ones.
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